Salt Lake County, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah v. Western Dairyman Cooperative Inc., Consolidated Realty Group, William K. Martin Jr., Herman L. Franks, and Charles L. Davis : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Salt Lake County, a body corporate and politic of
the State of Utah v. Western Dairyman Cooperative
Inc., Consolidated Realty Group, William K.
Martin Jr., Herman L. Franks, and Charles L. Davis :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig W. Anderson; Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney; Jay Stone; Deputy Salt Lake
County District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellant.
Mark J. Williams; Plant, Wallace, Christensen and Kanell; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Salt Lake County v. Western Dairyman Cooperative, No. 20000593.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/530
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 





CONSOLIDATED REALTY GROUP; 
WILLIAM K. MARTIN, JR., HERMAN 
L. FRANKS; and CHARLES L. DAVIS, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Priority Number 15 
Case No. 20000593-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, JUDGE SHEILA McCLEVE, CIVIL NUMBER 98096392 
MARK J. WILLIAMS (#3494) 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
Consolidated Realty Group; William K. Martin, Jr.; 
Herman L. Franks and Charles L. Davis 
CRAIG W. ANDERSON (#0078) 
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney 
JAY STONE (#3125) 
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney 
2001 South State #S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-2655 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
Salt Lake County 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1,2 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 3 
A. Nature of Case 3 
B. Course of Proceedings 3 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 4 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I 9 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE OF BREACH OF ANY DUTY BY CONSOLIDATED 
OR ITS AGENTS 
A. Consolidated met its duty of disclosure 9 
B. Consolidated did not breach any other fiduciary duties 18 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED 
POINT II 21 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT THE 
COUNTY'S CLAIMS AGAINST CONSOLIDATED WERE TORT AND 
NOT CONTRACT CLAIMS. THEREFORE, THE COUNTY'S CLAIMS 
ARE BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25(3) 
POINT III 24 
THE TPJAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING THE COUNTY'S 
RULE 56(f) MOTION 
POINT IV 27 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
American Tower Owners v. CCI Mechanical, 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) 25, 27 
Bracklein v. Realty Insurance Co., 95 Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471 (1938) 22, 23 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Const., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987) 22, 24 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah 1987) 25, 27 
Crossland Sav. v Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994) 2, 24, 25 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) 12, 22 
Easton v. Strassberger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984) 14, 15, 16 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) 1 
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992) 25 
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n., 814 P.2d 1099 (1991) 2 
Modern Home Inst., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 513 F.2d 102 
(2nd Cir. 1975) 27 
Robinson v. Anne Marie Grossman, 57 Cal. App. 4th 634, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380 
(1997) 15, 16, 17 
Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994) 12, 13, 17, 22 
Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986) 13, 14, 22 
Sevy v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958 (Utah App. 1993) 24 
State v. Larson, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) 2, 24 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONTINUED 
Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998) 1 
Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86 (Utah App. 1998) 11, 22 
Williams v. Wells & Bennett Realtors, 52 Cal. App. 4th 857, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (1997) 15 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §61-2-5.5 (1953 as amended) 22 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0) (1996) 1,17 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) (1953 as amended) 1, 2, 23 
California Civil Code §2079 15, 16 
Administrative Rules 
Utah Administrative Code R162-6-2 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 22 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) 3 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) 2 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 56(f) 1, 2, 4, 9, 24, 25, 27, 28 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) 2, 9, 27, 28 
IV 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case based on Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue No, 1: Was the trial court correct in granting Summary Judgment where 
there was no disputed evidence that Consolidated and its agents breached any fiduciary 
duties owed to the County? 
Issue No, 2: Was the trial court correct in ruling as a matter of law in its 
Summary Judgment that there was no breach of the Consolidated agents' duty of full 
disclosure, whether that duty arose in tort or contract, where there is no disputed evidence 
that the Consolidated agents knew about any of the buried demolition debris? 
Standard of Review for Issues 1 & 2: Summary judgment presents a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness. Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 
1238, 1243 (Utah 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue 
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). The Supreme Court may 
affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is 
one not relied upon below. Id. 
Issue No, 3: Was the trial court correct in denying plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion 
where there is no evidence to support plaintiffs speculation that Consolidated knew of 
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buried demolition debris or violated any other duty? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to deny a Rule 56(f) motion is 
reviewed under "the abuse of discretion standard." Crossland Sav. v Hatch, 877 P.2d 
1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court will not revise the trial court's ruling 
"unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Id. (quoting State v. Larson, 
865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993)). 
Issue No. 4: Was the trial court's certification of Consolidated's Summary 
Judgment as a final order pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b) proper? 
Standard of Review: Whether a court's certification of a final order is proper 
under Rule 54(b) is a question of law. Thus, the decision will be reviewed for 
correctness. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n., 814 P.2d 1099 (1991). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The following authorities are determinative of the issues: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) (1953 as amended). 
2. Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Rules 56(f) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. Rl 62-6-2 Utah Administrative Code. 
Copies of the above cited authorities are contained in the Addendum to this Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case. Salt Lake County (the "County"), as buyer, entered into a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") with Western Dairyman Cooperative, Inc. 
("WDCI"), as seller, to purchase real property. Charles L. Davis ("Davis"), a real estate 
agent with Consolidated Realty Group ("Consolidated"), represented the County and 
Herman L. Franks ("Franks"), also a real estate agent with Consolidated, represented 
WDCI in the transaction. William K. Martin ("Martin") acted as Consolidated's principal 
broker. After closing, the County encountered undisclosed subsurface conditions. This is 
an action arising out of the REPC where the County seeks to recover costs to cure the 
subsurface condition against WDCI and Davis, Franks and Martin and Consolidated 
(hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as "Consolidated"). 
B. Course of Proceedings. The County filed a complaint in Third District Court 
on or about June 26, 1998, alleging two causes of action against Consolidated: (1) breach 
of duty of reasonable care and (2) breach of duty to disclose. (Record at 00012-00034). 
Consolidated filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on August 28, 
1998. (Record at 00073). The motion was made based on the grounds that: (1) "under 
the applicable Utah case law," a real estate agent has no duty to disclose latent defects of 
which he has no knowledge; and (2) plaintiffs action is a tort claim barred by the 
"applicable statute of limitations." (Record at 00073-74). Affidavits of Davis, Franks 
and Martin were submitted in support of the motion and it was treated as a Motion for 
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Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Record at 
00095-103). The County opposed the motion and filed a Rule 56(f) motion for additional 
time to conduct discovery. (Record at 00136-147). A hearing was held on Consolidated's 
Motion to Dismiss together with the County's Rule 56(f) motion on February 19, 1999. 
(Record at 00244-250 and 00664). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. A Memorandum Decision was issued March 10, 
1999, denying the County's Rule 56(f) motion and granting Consolidated's Motion to 
Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. (Record 00264). The final Order was signed by the 
trial court on May 10, 1999. (Record at 00334). On May 18, 1999, the County filed a 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for New Trial. (Record at 00342). This Motion 
was heard by Judge McCleve on December 10, 1999. (Record at 00638). On May 8, 
2000, Judge McCleve entered an Order and Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b) Certification of Final 
Order affirming the May 10, 1999 Summary Judgment denying the County's Motion to 
Alter or Amend the Judgment. (Record at 00645). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. WDCI owned a 5.06 acre parcel of real property in Murray City, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, located at approximately 800 East 5300 South (the "Property") which 
formerly had been used as a milk processing plant until approximately 1986 when WDCI 
ceased operations. During its operation, the Property contained several buildings, parking 
areas and underground storage tanks. WDCI demolished the building in approximately 
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1992, removing all buildings from the surface. Unbeknownst to the parties to this appeal, 
the demolition was partial, and the remaining concrete footings, slabs, debris and other 
material were left buried under the surface. (Record at 00003-00004). 
2. During 1993, Franks, as agent for Consolidated, was retained to represent 
WDCI as the seller of the Property. At that time, there were no buildings or structures on 
the Property which were visible to any inspection of the surface. Neither Franks nor 
anyone at Consolidated was aware of or had ever been led to believe there were 
subsurface concrete and waste pilings, footings, slabs, debris or other material under the 
surface of the Property left after demolition. It appeared to Frank and all other 
representatives of Consolidated that the Property was a vacant lot covered with dirt, 
gravel and weeds. (Record at 00102). During June of 1993, the County began looking 
for land on which to build a new Environment Health building. They considered several 
sites, including the WDCI property. (Record 00004). 
3. During the summer of 1993, Lee Colvin ("Colvin"), a licensed real estate agent 
and broker employed by the County in the Contracts and Procurement Department's Real 
Estate Section, was requested by the County Health Department to assist it in locating 
commercial sites suitable for the Division of Environmental Health office building. 
(Record at 00154). Shortly thereafter, Colvin contacted Davis on behalf of the County 
and requested his assistance in locating a suitable commercial site for the Health 
Department building. Several sites were identified by Davis, including the Property. 
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(Record at 00154-155). 
4. After Davis informed Colvin of the Property, Colvin walked the site and 
observed that it was a vacant ground covered with weeds. He observed what appeared to 
be a striped asphalt and concrete parking pad on a portion of the Property. He was also 
aware that it had previously been occupied by Hi-Land Dairy and that the buildings had 
been demolished years ago. However, he stated that he saw no visible evidence of 
buildings, foundations or other structural elements at the time he walked the Property. 
(Record at 00155). 
5. Colvin wrote a letter dated September 24, 1993 to Davis informing him the 
County was preparing an offer on 4.96 acres on the southwest corner of Wood Oak and 
Vine Street and set forth the basic terms the County was willing to include in the offer. 
Colvin also indicated that he would instruct the County's attorneys to draft an offer for 
presentation to the County Commission for approval, and upon receiving approval, he 
would forward the offer to Davis for presentation to the seller. (Record at 00156-157, 
00163-164). 
6. Colvin arranged for an independent MAI appraisal to confirm the value of the 
Property. The valuation report did not disclose any latent defects affecting the value of 
the Property. (Record at 00156). 
7. The County, by its attorneys, drafted a Real Estate Purchase Contract 
("REPC") dated on or about December 24, 1993. (Record 00156 and 00166-169). 
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8. An Agency Disclosure was presented by Consolidated to the County for 
execution, confirming the relative duties of Consolidated as real estate agents 
representing both buyer and seller, and of the buyer and seller. (Record at 00170-00395). 
A counterpart of the Agency Disclosure was also signed on or about December 24, 1993 
by W.L. Cottrell, Vice President for WDCI. (Record at 00396). 
9. Before closing, WDCI provided documentation to Davis who delivered said 
documents to Colvin on behalf of the County regarding the demolition of buildings on 
both the east and west sides of Vine Street, removal of underground storage tanks and all 
other environmental conditions. (Record at 00103, 00157 and 00172). 
10. As part of the conditions precedent to the County's obligation to perform 
under the REPC, the County, by its attorney, drafted that their offer was subject to their 
satisfaction of an environmental audit to be performed at their own expense. 
Furthermore, the County required WDCI to provide it with copies of any environmental 
audits or reports already in their possession, including reports on removal of the 
underground tanks and hazardous materials spills, as well as any studies, surveys or 
information pertinent to the Property then in WDCFs possession. (Record at 00024). 
11. Consolidated, through Franks and Davis, provided copies of all 
documentation received from WDCI to the County prior to closing. Davis, as 
Consolidated agent representing the County, knew the County had its own real estate 
department, engineers, surveyors and appraisers review the Property prior to closing and 
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that Salt Lake County would be conducting tests they deemed necessary on the subject 
Property. (Record at 00097 and 00103). 
12. Salt Lake County undertook to conduct its own environmental testing and soil 
sampling of the Property in order to determine it to be free of contamination or 
environmental hazards. (Record at 00184). The County had a phase I environmental 
study done on the Property. (Record at 00663, page 44). Prior to closing, a report from 
the engineering firm of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator was given by WDCI to the County 
regarding a soils assessment on the Property. The report included data from at least six 
(6) soils borings to twelve (12) feet deep which had been performed on the Property. 
(Record at 00084 and 00324). 
13. The County encountered subsurface conditions including demolition debris 
during June 1997 when construction began. They claimed costs incurred in removing the 
subsurface concrete, back filling, compaction and construction delays in an amount in 
excess of $444,000. (Record at 00007-00009). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Summary judgment should be affirmed because there is no evidence of any 
breach of fiduciary duties by Consolidated and its agents. There is no evidence that any 
Consolidated agents knew of the buried debris under the Property, and there is no 
evidence of any breach of duty by Consolidated or its agents in representing the County. 
2. The fiduciary duties described in Agency Disclosure were merely a statement 
of existing common or administrative law duties of real estate agents/brokers; therefore, 
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any claim for breach of those duties gives rise to a tort claim, not a contract claim. 
3. The trial court was correct in denying Rule 56(f) motion because adequate 
discovery was undertaken and plaintiffs assertion of breach of duty by Consolidated is 
speculative and without merit. 
4. The trial court's Rule 54(b) certification of the summary judgment as a final 
order was justified since causes of action against Consolidated and its agents are separate 
from the causes of action against WDCI and stand on their own. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF BREACH OF ANY DUTY BY 
CONSOLIDATED OR ITS AGENTS. 
A. Consolidated met its duty of disclosure. 
There is no dispute in this matter on appeal that Consolidated, through its agents, 
acted in the role as dual or limited agents. (Record 00395-396). Despite the County's 
attempts to create factual disputes and to insinuate that Consolidated somehow violated 
the Utah Real Estate Commission's rules and common law governing licensed real estate 
brokers or agents, as disclosed in the Agency Disclosure (Record at 00395), a straight-
forward review of those rules and cases demonstrate not only compliance by 
Consolidated and its agents, but support for summary judgment. 
Utah Administrative Code Rl62-6-2.6.2.7 requires that in every real estate 
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transaction involving a real estate broker or agent, "the licensee shall clearly disclose in 
writing to the buyer and seller . . . his agency relationship(s). The disclosure shall be 
made prior to the buyer and seller . . . entering into a binding agreement with each other." 
Furthermore, Utah Admin. Rl62-6-2.6.2.7.1 requires that the prior agency disclosure is to 
be confirmed in a separate provision incorporated in or attached to the agreement by 
including the following language: 
AGENCY DISCLOSURE: At the signing of this contract the listing agent 
represents ( ) Buyer ( ) Seller, and the selling agent represents ( ) Buyer 
( ) Seller. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this contract 
written disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided to him/her. 
( ) (Buyer's Initials) ( ) (Seller's Initials). 
Separate copies of the Agency Disclosures were signed by both Salt Lake County 
(Record at 00395) and by WDCI (Record at 00396). As required by the Administrative 
Rules, the REPC (Record at 00392-394) confirmed the existence of the Agency 
Disclosure at paragraph 4 wherein it was disclosed that the listing agent, Franks, 
represented the seller, and the selling agent, Davis, represented the buyer. By initialing 
that section, both buyer and seller confirmed that prior to signing the REPC, "written 
disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided" to them. {Id.). The Agency 
Disclosure is just that - a disclosure to both buyer and seller of the respective duties of the 
agents representing both buyer and seller and of the duties of buyer and seller - not a 
contract. 
The Agency Disclosure informed the County and WDCI of the duties of a real 
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estate agent acting in the role as "dual agent" or "limited agent," which disclosure 
basically reaffirmed the fiduciary duties owed by real estate brokers/agents to their 
respective clients as established under the Utah Real Estate Commission's rules set forth 
in the Administrative Code. See Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 89 n.3 (Utah App. 
1998). Even though it is conceded that the Agency Disclosure actually exceeds in some 
ways the specific requirements of Utah Admin. Code Rl 62-6-2.6.2.16.3, the basic duties 
of a dual or limited agent as set forth in the Agency Disclosure include a fiduciary duty of 
care, integrity, honesty and loyalty in dealings with both buyer and seller, a duty to 
exercise reasonable care, skills and diligence in performance of the agents' duties, a duty 
of honesty and fair dealing with good faith, and a duty to disclose all facts known to the 
agent which materially affect the value of the property "that are not known to or within 
the diligent attention and observation of the parties," except for the disclosure that the 
seller will accept the price less than the listing price or that the buyer will pay a greater 
price than the offering price. (Record 00395). 
Utah Administrative Code R162-6-2.6.2.16.3.1 establishes the duty of neutrality. 
This duty requires both buyer and seller to give up "their right to demand undivided 
loyalty from the agent" where the agent is to advance the interest of each party as long as 
that does not create a conflict with the interest of the other party. Utah Admin. Code 
R162-6-2.6.2.16.3.1(a). This duty of neutrality would also impose the duty of obedience 
which obligates the agent and broker to obey all instructions from either buyer and seller 
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as long as the agent's duty of neutrality was maintained. Utah Admin. Code R162-
2.6.2.16.3.2(a). Nevertheless, there is no requirement under Utah law, either through 
statutory, administrative or common law, for an agent to undertake an investigation. The 
agent only has a duty to disclose material information which the "agent learns about the 
property" (Utah Admin. Code. Rl62-6-2.6.2.16.2(c)) or those "latent or significant patent 
defects of which the agent is aware." Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1390 (Utah 
App. 1994); see also Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248-1249 (Utah 1980). 
In its initial Memorandum in Opposition to Consolidated's Motion to Dismiss as 
well as in this appeal, the County has argued that summary judgment ought to be 
precluded because Consolidated's duty analysis is erroneously based on Schafir v. 
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994). See Applnt. Brief at 26-27; see also Record 
at 00117-119. The County asserts that Schafir is inapposite because: (1) that case 
involved a tort claim since there was "no contract" defining the duties of the parties; (2) 
the decision addressed only the duty of the selling agent to buyer; (3) it does not address 
the duties of the buyer's agent; and (4) it does not define the duties of a broker in a dual 
agency relationship. Applnt. Brief at 26-27. The County errs in its first assertion, since it 
must be assumed from the facts that Bennion, who was identified as "the listing real 
estate agent for the sale" was acting pursuant to an agency disclosure as required by the 
Real Estate Commission's rules. Hence, it can be safely assumed that Bennion was 
operating under the same or similar rules that are applicable to the facts of this case on 
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appeal. 
Even though Schafir involved the duty owed by a listing agent to a buyer, the duty 
of an agent, as it relates to disclosure, does not differ regardless of whether the agent is 
the buyer's, seller's or a dual agent. In any of the three possible relationships, a real 
estate agent has an obligation to disclose any material facts, including latent or significant 
patent defects, of which the agent is aware. However, there is no administrative rule, case 
law or statute which requires a real estate agent, acting as buyer's agent, a listing agent, or 
as a limited or dual agent to affirmatively discover latent defects. To graft that duty upon 
the existing law in Utah would create an untenable situation requiring real estate agents to 
undertake responsibility and liability well beyond the scope or training of their 
profession. Real estate brokers and agents would be required to perform tasks of 
geotechnical engineers, home inspectors, lawyers, surveyors, and contractors if that 
affirmative duty to discover defects in the property were imposed upon them. The courts, 
the Real Estate Commission and the Legislature have all recognized this reality and 
consequently only require the agent to inform the buyer of "all material information 
which the agent learns about the property or the seller's ability to perform his obligation . 
. . ." See Utah Admin. Code R162-6-2.6.2.16.2(c); see also Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1390 (the 
agent's duty to be honest and truthful includes the obligation to disclose defects of which 
the agent is aware). 
The County has suggested that Consolidated has ignored Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 
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790, 795 n.l (Utah 1986) which cites Easton v. Strassberger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 
Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (1984). The County argues that Easton establishes a different 
standard applicable to real estate brokers where the court upheld the following 
instruction: 
A real estate broker is a licensed person or entity who holds himself out to 
the public as having particular skills and knowledge in the real estate field. 
He is under a duty to disclose facts materially affecting the value or 
desirability of the property that are known to him or which through 
reasonable diligence should be known to him. 
Secor, 716 P.2d at 795 n.l (quoting Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 
387). Without defining or clarifying what the phrase "which through reasonable 
diligence should be known to him" means, the County implies that Consolidated and its 
agents had some sort of duty to investigate further the subsurface ground, beyond the 
same visual inspection performed by the County's own in-house real estate agent, Lee 
Colvin. That position is not supported by Utah law. 
Even accepting the dicta in footnote 1 of Secor as precedent, this did not create a 
duty of Consolidated to affirmatively undertake any investigation of the subsurface 
conditions on the Property. In fact, the Easton question has been substantially 
distinguished and clarified through case law in California and specific legislation 
subsequent to Secor. 
In 1997, the Court of Appeals of California addressed the duty of care of a real 
estate agent to potential purchasers, as first pronounced in Easton, by addressing the 
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legislation which added a new article to the California Civil Code (section 2079 et seq) 
entitled "Duty to Prospective Purchaser of Residential Property." Stats. 1985, ch. 223, 
§2, p. 1221. The court explained that the Code contained the following express statement 
of legislative intent, as amended and codified in 1994: 
(a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares all of the following: (1) That 
the imprecision of terms in the opinion rendered in Easton . .., and the 
absence of a comprehensive declaration of duties, standards, and 
exceptions, has caused insurers to modify professional liability coverage of 
real estate licensees and has caused confusion among real estate licensees as 
to the manner of performing the duty ascribed to them by the cour t . . . . (4) 
That sections 2079 to 2079.6, inclusive, of this article should be construed 
as a definition of the duty of care found to exist by the holding of Easton . . 
., and the manner of its discharge . . . . (b) It is the intent of the Legislature 
to codify and make precise the holding of Easton . . . . It is not the intent of 
the Legislature to modify or restrict existing duties owed by real estate 
licensees. 
Robinson v. Anne Marie Grossman, 57 Cal. App. 4th 634, 640-41, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 
383 (1997). 
In a footnote to the foregoing quote, the California Court of Appeal stated that 
subdivision (b) of section 2079.12 of the California Code was interpreted "to mean the 
Legislature had no intention of changing the existing law 'requiring] the agents to 
disclose material defects known to the broker, but unknown to the prospective buyer.'" 
Id. at n.3 (quoting Williams v. Wells & Bennett Realtors, 52 Cal. App. 4th 857, 863, 61 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (1997)). 
Robinson further quoted Section 2079 as defining the duty of a real estate broker 
or agent to prospective buyers of residential real estate "to conduct a reasonable, 
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competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale and to disclose to 
that prospective purchaser all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the 
property that an investigation would reveal.. . ." Id. The inspection required by Section 
2079 "does not include or involve an inspection of areas that are reasonably and normally 
inaccessible to such an inspection " Id. 57 Cal. App. 4th at 641, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 384 
n.4 (quoting Cal.Civil Code §2079.3). Finally, Robinson emphasized that nothing in the 
article "relieves the buyer or prospective buyer of the duty to exercise reasonable care to 
protect himself or herself, including those facts which are known to or within the diligent 
attention and observation of the buyer or prospective buyer." Id. at n.4 (quoting Cal. 
Civil Code §2079.5). 
The California Court of Appeals refused to accept Robinson's argument that the 
disclosure duties under §2079 included "a duty to independently verify or disclaim the 
accuracy of the seller's representations." Instead, the court reasoned that the Legislature 
sought to foster the availability of professional negligence insurance by 
eliminating the implication oiEaston that a seller's agent could have 
negligence liability for relying in good faith upon the seller's 
representations or failing to discharge a vague obligation to obtain 
professional inspections or reports to confirm those representations. 
In other words, under the ipost-Easton statutory scheme, once the sellers and 
their agent make the required disclosures, it is incumbent upon the potential 
purchasers to investigate and make an informed decision based thereon. In 
making the required disclosures, the sellers' agent is required only to act in 
good faith and not convey the seller's representations without a reasonable 
basis for believing them to be true. 
57 Cal. App. 4th at 643-44, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385. Following this reasoning, the 
16 
Robinson court found the listing agent to be reasonable by relying upon the disclosure of 
the seller that the stucco cracks were cosmetic and had been patched with stucco and glue 
mixture, despite the contradictory testimony by plaintiffs expert that it was due to 
geotechnical instability. 57 Cal. App. 4th at 644, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386. 
The duty of disclosure established under the Agency Disclosure which is the 
subject of this appeal (Record at 00395) is consistent with the foregoing analysis set forth 
in Robinson. Both are consistent with Schafir. The section in the Disclosure Agreement 
containing the duties of an agent representing both buyer and seller incorporates the 
duties to the seller's agent and the buyer's agent as stated in their respective sections 
within the Agency Disclosure document. The section under the heading of "Duties of 
Buyer's Agent" states that the agent has the following duty: 
(c) A duty to disclose all facts known to the agent which materially affect 
the value of the property that are not known to or within the diligent 
attention and observation of the parties. 
(Record at 00395) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Agency Disclosure includes the 
following "Duties of Buyer and Seller": 
The above duties of real estate agents in a real estate transaction do not 
relieve a Seller or a Buyer from the responsibility to exercise good business 
judgment in protecting their respective interests. You should carefully read 
all agreements to assure that they adequately express your understanding of 
the transaction. If legal or tax advise is desired, consult a competent 
professional attorney or accountant. 
(Id.) Again, this language is consistent with Schafir which places the responsibility "to 
observe patent, and any discoverable latent defects" on the buyer . Schafir, 879 P.2d at 
17 
1390. 
Based on the foregoing reasons, it becomes evident that neither Consolidated nor 
its agents or broker knew or should have known of any subsurface condition. The 
applicable law does not impose such a duty. Thus, the County has failed to establish any 
evidence to preclude summary judgment on their claim against Consolidated for failure to 
disclose. 
B. Consolidated did not breach any other fiduciary duties. 
As an additional basis for preclusion of summary judgment, the County has also 
claimed Consolidated failed to exercise properly its "contractual fiduciary duties" beyond 
plaintiffs disclosure objections. The County claims that Consolidated breached its 
fiduciary duties by: (a) failing to include or recommend inclusion of provisions in the 
REPC warranting against subsurface conditions resulting from previous demolition on the 
Property; (b) failing to request WDCI "to provide a full and honest disclosure of the 
subsurface conditions;" (c) failing to advise the County to "investigate and verify whether 
WDCI had fully demolished all the buildings" and whether the County should undertake 
additional investigation of the Property. (Record at 00017); Applnt. Brief at 23. The 
record on appeal contradicts the County's claims by demonstrating that Consolidated in 
fact did not breach any fiduciary duties and, consequently, is entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
The letter dated September 24, 1993, written by Colvin, addressed to Davis at 
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Consolidated, informed Davis that Salt Lake County was preparing an offer for the 
Property. Colvin, as an employee and agent for the County, was himself a real estate 
agent and broker with many years of experience. (Record at 00154). Colvin specified the 
terms and conditions of the offer which would be drafted by a County Attorney and 
approved by the County Commission. (Record at 00163). Only after the offer was 
drafted by County Attorneys and approved by the Commission would Colvin forward it 
to Davis for presentation to the seller. In other words, Davis was merely being treated as 
a facilitator or conduit in passing on the offer. The terms of the REPC were already 
drafted by the County's own attorneys by the time it was presented in final form to Davis 
for presentation to WDCI in keeping with the admonition contained in the Agency 
Disclosure for the buyer to "consult a competent professional attorney" if legal advice 
was desired. Further, Davis had the obligation to obey the instructions of his client, the 
County, in accordance with Utah Admin. Code. Rl62-6-2.6.2.16.3.2(a). 
Davis certainly could have reasonably expected the County, given its size, 
sophistication and staff, to make all reasonable inquiry to perform the County's own due 
diligence pursuant to the requirements set forth in their proposed offer. It was reasonable 
for Davis to believe any subsequent conditions would be discovered from the 
environmental testing and soil sampling within the 90 day period proposed by the County 
as part of their due diligence testing. Furthermore, the County would have an opportunity 
to review all information available on environmental issues relating to the site provided 
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by the seller. Davis would have overstepped his level of training and scope of practice to 
presume he could suggest language in the REPC different than the requirements and 
conditions drafted by the County's own attorneys. The REPC terms, especially the 
addendum, appears to encompass and allow a complete disclosure, review and inspection 
of the Property, which would allow discovery of any negative conditions one might 
expect to encounter. If the County failed to uncover information regarding the extent of 
the demolition, if such information were available, it was not due to any failure of 
Consolidated to act. Rather, it was due to the County's failure to perform adequately 
their investigation and inspection which they mandated in their offer. 
Salt Lake County even hired an independent engineering firm of Eckhoff, Watson 
& Preator Engineering who did a preliminary soil assessment for underground storage 
tank removal at the site on or about October 12, 1989, and provided a written report to the 
County. (Record at 00084 and 00324). They also provided the County with the results of 
six (6) soil borings to twelve (12) feet each. The County's engineers also provided a 
schematic drawing of the old Highland Dairy site plan, which included an apparent 
outline of the demolished building footprint. (Record at 00094). Based on that site 
evaluation, Salt Lake County at any time could have performed further investigation to 
discover the extent of the footings of the demolished property, but chose not to. There is 
no basis for the County's argument that somehow the Consolidated defendants should 
have known of the subsurface conditions, or that they should have given legal advice to 
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to review all information available on environmental issues relating to the site provided 
by the seller. Davis would have overstepped his level of training and scope of practice to 
presume he could suggest language in the REPC different than the requirements and 
conditions drafted by the County's own attorneys. The REPC terms, especially the 
addendum, appears to encompass and allow a complete disclosure, review and inspection 
of the Property, which would allow discovery of any negative conditions one might 
expect to encounter. If the County failed to uncover information regarding the extent of 
the demolition, if such information were available, it was not due to any failure of 
Consolidated to act. Rather, it was due to the County's failure to perform adequately 
their investigation and inspection which they mandated in their offer. 
Prior to closing, WDCI gave Salt Lake County a written report by the independent 
engineering firm of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator Engineering which did a preliminary soil 
assessment for underground storage tank removal at the site on or about October 12, 
1989. (Record at 00084 and 00324). They also provided the County with the results of 
six (6) soil borings to twelve (12) feet each. The County received a schematic drawing of 
the old Highland Dairy site plan, which included an apparent outline of the demolished 
building footprint. (Record at 00094). Salt Lake County at any time could have 
performed further investigation to discover the extent of the footings of the demolished 
property, but chose not to. The Consolidated defendants should not have been expected 
to know of the subsurface conditions, or to have given legal advice to 
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the County to include certain contractual provisions warranting that the Property was free 
from subsurface debris. Under Addendum 1 attached to the REPC (Record at 00168), all 
those concerns were explicitly or implicitly included in the language drafted by the 
County's attorney. Davis was given this packet only after the County determined what 
due diligence was necessary to satisfy itself of the Property's suitability for the proposed 
Department of Health building. Consolidated was not, and should not as a matter of law 
be placed in the position of second-guessing the legal work of Salt Lake County. In short, 
there is no evidence of any breach of duty on the part of Consolidated. Rather, the 
County appears to attempt to shift blame. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT THE 
COUNTY'S CLAIMS AGAINST CONSOLIDATED WERE TORT 
AND NOT CONTRACT CLAIMS. THEREFORE, THE COUNTY'S 
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25(3). 
As discussed above, the Agency Disclosure was used to inform the parties of the 
duties owed by the real estate agents to the respective parties to the transaction. The 
duties existed as a result of the agency relationship agreed to by both the County and 
WDCI. Even without the existence of the Agency Disclosure, those basic duties at issue 
in this appeal would have been owed to the buyer and the seller because they were 
independently established by common law and the Utah Administrative Code Rules. See 
Wardley Corp., 969 P. 2d at 89 n.3; Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1390; Secor, 716 P.2d at 795; 
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Dugan, 615P.2dat 1248. 
Any liability of Consolidated which might arise under the facts of this case is not 
imposed by the terms of the Agency Disclosure, but by the rules set forth by the Real 
Estate Commission under the Utah Administrative Rules, as authorized by the Utah 
Legislature, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §61-2-5.5 (1953 as amended), which allows the 
Commissioner to make rules which establish "standards of conduct for real estate 
licensees". As a result of this authority, the duties of agents are set forth under the 
Admin. Code Rl 62-6-2 entitled "Standards of Practice." 
This Court ruled in Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Const., 1AA P.2d 1370, 1372 
(Utah 1987) that the following test applied in determining whether a six-year period 
statute of limitation for contract liability applies to a particular fact situation: "[I]f the 
fact of liability arises or is assumed or imposed from the instrument itself, or its recitals, 
the liability is founded upon an instrument in writing." Id. (quoting Bracklein v. Realty 
Insurance Co., 95 Utah 490, 500, 80 P.2d 471, 476 (1938)). Applying the Bracklein test, 
this Court found that 
Absent the contractual obligations . . . the two contractors would have no 
obligation to supervise construction of the Missionary Training Center. 
Only the alleged breach of their contractual duties gives BYU any basis for 
asserting that they are liable for the cost of replacing the pipes. BYU's 
claims are, therefore, actions upon contracts founded on instruments in 
writing and, as such clearly fall within the scope of the six-year period of 
limitation in section 78-12-23. 
Id. 
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If the same test is applied to our fact situation to determine whether the County's 
claim of breach of duty against Consolidated constitutes a contract claim or tort claim, the 
only conclusion which can fairly be reached is that actions are for tort liability. In the 
absence of the Agency Disclosure, Consolidated would still have been subject to the 
standards and duties imposed on all licensed agents and brokers in Utah by common law 
and the Utah Administrative Code. Those duties existed independently from the Agency 
Disclosure. This fact demonstrated that the Agency Disclosure was not a contract. It was 
merely a disclosure to the parties to the transaction of the respective duties owed by the 
brokers and agents and the duties of the buyer and seller as it related to the transaction. 
Thus, based on the nature of the Agency Disclosure and the Bracklein test, the claims of 
the County against Consolidated are actions in tort, and subject to the four-year statute of 
limitation in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) (1953 as amended). 
The County has admitted that the closing of the sale of the Property took place on 
April 25, 1994. (Record at 00007). The County also alleged in its Complaint that "about 
the first week of June, 1997" its contractor discovered "a subsurface concrete vault . . . a 
piped irrigation ditch, and large subsurface concrete slabs, footings and rebar." (Record 
at 00008). Thus, the County, by its own admissions, was aware of the subsurface debris 
more than ten (10) months before the expiration of the four-year statute of limitation. 
The County did not file its Complaint until June 26, 1998, after the applicable statute of 
limitation had run. 
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Because the subsurface defects were not visible to the County in their site visits, 
one can argue that they are given equitable relief through the discovery rule exception to 
the statute of limitations. See generally, Sevy v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958 (Utah 
App. 1993). However, the discovery rule does not apply to plaintiffs who become aware 
of such undiscovered defects before the statute of limitation has expired. Brigham 
Young, 744 P.2d at 1374. This Court has ruled that this "discovery rule has no 
application when an action easily could have been filed between the date of discovery and 
the end of the limitation period." Id. Where, at the very latest, plaintiff could have filed 
its complaint within the ten-month period between its discovery and the running of the 
statute of limitations, plaintiffs claims against Consolidated and its agents should be 
dismissed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING THE 
COUNTY'S RULE 56(f) MOTION. 
The trial court's decision to deny Rule 56(f) motion should be overturned only if it 
is found to have abused its discretion. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it "will 
not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Crossland Savings v. 
Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Larson, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 
(Utah 1993)). Even though trial courts should liberally grant Rule 56(f) motions, they are 
not required to grant them if the movants are either dilatory or the claims are lacking in 
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merit. Crossland, 877 P.2d at 1243; American Tower Owners v. CCIMechanical, 930 
P.2d 1182, 1195 (Utah 1996). Moreover, a trial court should not grant a Rule 56(f) 
motion simply to protect a plaintiff from the merits of a motion for summary judgment. 
American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1195 (citing Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 
561 (Utah App. 1992)). This Court has previously delineated the following factors which 
should be considered under any appeal of a denial of Rule 56(f) motion: (1) Whether the 
affidavit articulated "adequate reasons or is the opposing party only on a 'fishing 
expedition5 for purely speculative facts after substantial discovery has been conducted 
without producing any significant evidence?" (2) Whether there was sufficient time since 
the filing of the complaint for plaintiff to use discovery procedures allowing cross-
examination of the moving party? (3) If discovery was initiated on a timely basis, was 
plaintiff given an appropriate response? Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 
841 (Utah 1987). 
The County argued in its Rule 56(f) motion that it was entitled to further discovery 
to "examine the defendants under oath as to the extent of its [sic] knowledge of all related 
matters to test its [sic] core assertion that it [sic] lacked any knowledge of the 
concealment of the subsurface conditions." (Record at 00143). In his affidavit, Patrick F. 
Holden, Salt Lake County Attorney, stated that the County needed to depose WDCI 
employees "to ascertain what, if anything, they told Consolidated, et al. about the 
condition of the subject property." (Record at 00149-150). Additionally, Mr. Holden 
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stated that the County needed to conduct discovery "to ascertain what defendants [sic] 
business practices are for listing property, whether they were followed in the instant case, 
and if not, why not. These facts are relevant to whether Consolidated et al. breached their 
fiduciary duties to Salt Lake County." (Record at 00150). 
By their very assertions, the facts to counter the affidavits of Franks, Davis and 
Martin were not exclusively within the control of the Consolidated defendants. Thus, the 
County should have been able to obtain the information from other sources, including 
informal discussions for discovery with WDCI personnel. Despite plaintiffs assertion to 
the contrary, the County had ample opportunity to try to test the statements of lack of 
knowledge by the Consolidated defendants before final judgment was entered. The 
complaint was filed June 26, 1998. (Record at 00001). The Motion to Dismiss was filed 
on August 28, 1998 (Record at 00073), followed by the filing of the County's Rule 56(f) 
motion on September 21, 1998. (Record at 00136). A hearing on the Rule 56(f) motion 
was not held until February 19, 1999. (Record at 00664). The County undertook informal 
and formal discovery during that entire period up to the time of the hearing on its Motion 
to Alter or Amend Judgment or For New Trial on December 10, 1999. The County took 
the deposition of W. Lynn Cottrell, Vice President of WDCI at the time of the transaction, 
on May 11, 1999. (Record at 00527). 
The County served written interrogatories to defendants which further tested the 
basis of its claims against defendants Franks (Record at 00251), defendant Martin 
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(Record at 00252) and defendant WDCI (Record at 00254). Despite the County's 
informal and formal discovery, no evidence has been identified that would contradict the 
affidavits of Franks, Martin and Davis. In other words, the most that Salt Lake County 
could hope for is an opportunity to discredit the statements made by Martin, Franks and 
Davis in their affidavits. Under those circumstances, the Utah Court of Appeals, in 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins, Co., ruled that no material fact was presented, and the Rule 
56(f) motion should be denied. 745 P.2d at 841 (citing Modern Home Inst, Inc. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 513 F.2d 102, 110 (2nd Cir. 1975)). 
Whether seeking additional time to discover the Consolidated agents' knowledge 
of underground debris or their breaches of duty, such requests lack merit for the reasons 
set forth above. The County has attempted to impose duties in connection with the 
subject transaction on the Consolidated defendants which do not otherwise exist at law. 
Where the motions are found to be "lacking merit," they may properly be denied. Rule 
56(f) motions should not be granted merely to protect parties from the merits of the 
motion for summary judgment. American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1135. The County's 
claims lack merit. Hence, this Court should affirm the denial of the County's Rule 56(f) 
motion even if the trial court's reasoning was not specifically set forth. 
POINT IV 
CONSOLIDATED IS ENTITLED TO RULE 54(b) 
CERTIFICATION. 
The trial court issued a Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b) Certification of Final Order in 
27 
connection with its Order denying plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or For 
a New Trial, when it ratified the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of 
Consolidated. (Record at 00645-649). The County avers that 54(b) Certification is 
improper in that a significant factual overlap exists between the operative facts relating to 
the claims against the Consolidated defendants and those remaining against WDCI. 
Applnt. Brief at 41. However, as set forth in paragraph 3 of the Certification, the causes 
of action against Consolidated and its agents are based on their separate roles as real 
estate agents/brokers, and are distinct from the causes of action alleged by plaintiff 
against WDCI, as seller of the subject property. It has already been demonstrated that 
there is no evidence to implicate any knowledge by the Consolidated defendants of the 
underground debris. The County has had its opportunity to discover this, and has come 
up empty-handed. Whether WDCI had any knowledge which was not disclosed is 
another matter. Certainly, this is a distinct issue relating only to WDCI. The 
Consolidated defendants are, therefore, entitled to be released and the summary judgment 
certified as a final order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Consolidated, Martin, Franks and Davis request 
the Court to affirm the Summary Judgment and the denial of the County's Rule 56(f) 
Motion. 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) (1953 as amended). 
B. Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Rules 56(f) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
D. Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
E. Rl62-6-2 Utah Administrative Code. 
ADDENDUM A 
1 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on 
an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store 
account; also on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four 
years after the last charge is made or the last payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25, Chapter 
6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action to one year, 
under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
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ADDENDUM B 
1 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed 
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon 
make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified 
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time 
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the 
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
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ADDENDUM C 
1 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed 
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon 
make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified 
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific fkcts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time 
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the 
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
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ADDENDUM D 
1 
Rule 54, Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from 
which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, 
or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for 
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights 
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
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Rl 62-6-2. Standards of Practice. 
6.2.1. Approved Forms. The following standard forms are approved by the Utah Real Estate 
Commission and the Office of the Attorney General for use by all licensees: 
(a) September 30, 1999, Real Estate Purchase Contract (mandated use of this form is July 1, 
2000); 
(b) January 1, 1999 Real Estate Purchase Contract for Residential Construction; 
(c) January 1, 1987, Uniform Real Estate Contract; 
(d) October 1, 1983, All Inclusive Trust Deed; 
(e) October 1, 1983, All Inclusive Promissory Note Secured by All Inclusive Trust Deed; 
(f) January 1,1999, Addendum/Counteroffer to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(g) January 1, 1999, Seller Financing Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(h) January 1, 1999, Survey Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(i) January 1,1999, Buyer Financial Information Sheet; 
(j) January 1,1999, FHA/VA Loan Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(k) January 1, 1999, Assumption Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(1) January 1,1999, Lead-based Paint Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(m) January 1, 1999, Disclosure and Acknowledgment Regarding Lead-based Paint and/or 
Lead-based Paint Hazards. 
6.2.1.1. Forms Required for Closing. Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out 
forms in addition to the standard state-approved forms if the additional forms are necessary to 
close a transaction. Examples include closing statements, and warranty or quit claim deeds. 
6.2.1.2. Forms Prepared by an Attorney. Any licensee may fill out forms prepared by the 
attorney for the buyer or lessee or the attorney for the seller or lessor to be used in place of any 
form listed in Rl 62-6.2.1 (a) through (g) if the buyer or lessee or the seller or lessor requests that 
other forms be used and the licensee verifies that the forms have in fact been drafted by the 
attorney for the buyer or lessee, or the attorney for the seller or lessor. 
6.2.1.3. Additional Forms. If it is necessary for a licensee to use a form for which there is no 
state-approved form, for example, the licensee may fill in the blanks on any form which has been 
prepared by an attorney, regardless of whether the attorney was employed for the purpose by the 
buyer, seller, lessor, lessee, brokerage, or an entity whose business enterprise is selling blank 
legal forms. 
6.2.1.4. Standard Supplementary Clauses. There are Standard Supplementary Clauses 
approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission which may be added to Real Estate Purchase 
Contracts by all licensees. The use of the Standard Supplementary Clauses will not be 
considered the unauthorized practice of law. 
6.2.2. Copies of Agreement. After a purchase agreement is properly signed by both the 
buyer and seller, it is the responsibility of each participating licensee to cause copies thereof, 
bearing all signatures, to be delivered or mailed to the buyer and seller with whom the licensee is 
dealing. The licensee preparing the document shall not have the parties sign for a final copy of 
the document prior to all parties signing the contract evidencing agreement to the terms thereof. 
After a lease is properly signed by both landlord and tenant, it is the responsibility of the 
principal broker to cause copies of the lease to be delivered or mailed to the landlord or tenant 
with whom the brokerage or property management company is dealing. 
6.2.3. Residential Construction Agreement. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement for 
Residential Construction must be used for all transactions for the construction of dwellings to be 
built or presently under construction for which a Certificate of Occupancy has not been issued. 
6.2.4. Employee Licensee. A real estate licensee working as a regular salaried employee as 
defined in section 1 of these rules, who sells real estate owned by the employer or leases real 
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estate owned by the employer, may only do so and may only be compensated directly by the 
employer under one of the following conditions: (1) the licensee is a principal broker; (2) the 
employer has on its staff a principal broker with whom the licensee affiliates for sales or 
management transactions; or (3) the employer contracts with a principal broker so that all 
employed licensees are affiliated with and supervised by a principal broker. 
6.2.5. Real Estate Auctions. A principal broker who contracts or in any manner affiliates 
with an auctioneer or auction company which is not licensed under the provisions of Section 
61-2-1 et seq. for the purpose of enabling that auctioneer or auction company to auction real 
property in this state, shall be responsible to assure that all aspects of the auction comply with the 
requirements of this section and all other laws otherwise applicable to real estate licensees in real 
estate transactions. Auctioneers and auction companies who are not licensed under the 
provisions of Section 61-2-1 et seq. may conduct auctions of real property located within this 
state upon the following conditions: 
6.2.5.1. Advertising. All advertising and promotional materials associated with an auction 
must conspicuously disclose that the auction is conducted under the supervision of a named 
principal broker licensed in this state; and 
6.2.5.2. Supervision. The auction must be conducted under the supervision of a principal 
broker licensed in this state who must be present at the auction; and 
6.2.5.3. Use of Approved Forms. Any purchase agreements used at the auction must meet 
the requirements of Section 61-2-20 and must be filled out by a Utah real estate licensee; and 
6.2.5.4. Placement of Deposits. All monies deposited at the auction must be placed either in 
the real estate trust account of the principal broker who is supervising the auction or in an escrow 
depository agreed to in writing by the parties to the transaction. 
6.2.5.5. Closing Arrangements. The principal broker supervising the auction shall be 
responsible to assure that adequate arrangements are made for the closing of each real estate 
transaction arising out of the auction. 
6.2.6. Guaranteed Sales. As used herein, the term "guaranteed sales plan" includes: (a) any 
plan in which a seller's real estate is guaranteed to be sold or; (b) any plan whereby a licensee or 
anyone affiliated with a licensee will purchase a seller's real estate if it is not purchased by a third 
party in the specified period of a listing or within some other specified period of time. 
6.2.6.1. In any real estate transaction involving a guaranteed sales plan, the licensee shall 
provide full disclosure as provided herein regarding the guarantee: 
(a) Written Advertising. Any written advertisement by a licensee of a "guaranteed sales 
plan" shall include a statement advising the seller that if the seller is eligible, costs and 
conditions may apply and advising the seller to inquire of the licensee as to the terms of the 
guaranteed sales agreement. This information shall be set forth in print at least one-fourth as 
large as the largest print in the advertisement. 
(b) Radio/Television Advertising. Any radio or television advertisement by a licensee of a 
"guaranteed sales plan" shall include a conspicuous statement advising if any conditions and 
limitations apply. 
(c) Guaranteed Sales Agreements. Every guaranteed sales agreement must be in writing and 
contain all of the conditions and other terms under which the property is guaranteed to be sold or 
purchased, including the charges or other costs for the service or plan, the price for which the 
property will be sold or purchased and the approximate net proceeds the seller may reasonably 
expect to receive. 
6.2.7. Agency Disclosure. In every real estate transaction involving a licensee, as agent or 
principal, the licensee shall clearly disclose in writing to his respective client(s) or any 
unrepresented parties, his agency relationship(s). The disclosure shall be made prior to the 
parties entering into a binding agreement with each other. The disclosure shall become part of 
the permanent file. 
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6.2.7.1. When a binding agreement is signed in a sales transaction, the prior agency 
disclosure shall be confirmed in the currently approved Real Estate Purchase Contract or, with 
substantially similar language, in a separate provision incorporated in or attached to that binding 
agreement. 
6.2.7.2. When a lease or rental agreement is signed, a separate provision shall be 
incorporated in or attached to it confirming the prior agency disclosure. The agency disclosure 
shall be in the form stated in Rl 62-6.2.7.1, but shall substitute terms applicable for a rental 
transaction for the terms "buyer", "seller", "listing agent", and "selling agent". 
6.2.7.3. Disclosure to other agents. An agent who has established an agency relationship 
with a principal shall disclose who he or she represents to another agent upon initial contact with 
the other agent. 
6.2.8. Duty to Inform. Sales agents and associate brokers must keep their principal broker or 
branch broker informed on a timely basis of all real estate transactions in which the licensee is 
involved, as agent or principal, in which the licensee has received funds on behalf of the 
principal broker or in which an offer has been written. 
6.2.9. Broker Supervision. Principal brokers and associate brokers who are branch brokers 
shall be responsible for exercising active supervision over the conduct of all licensees affiliated 
with them. 
6.2.9.1. A broker will not be held responsible for inadequate supervision if: 
(a) An affiliated licensee violates a provision of Section 61-2-1, et seq., or the rules 
promulgated thereunder, in contravention of the supervising broker's specific written policies or 
instructions; and 
(b) Reasonable procedures were established by the broker to ensure that licensees receive 
adequate supervision and the broker has followed those procedures; and 
(c) Upon learning of the violation, the broker attempted to prevent or mitigate the damage; 
and 
(d) The broker did not participate in the violation; and 
(e) The broker did not ratify the violation; and 
(f) The broker did not attempt to avoid learning of the violation. 
6.2.9.2. The existence of an independent contractor relationship or any other special 
compensation arrangement between the broker and affiliated licensees shall not release the 
broker and licensees of any duties, obligations, or responsibilities. 
6.2.10. Disclosure of Fees. If a real estate licensee who is acting as an agent in a transaction 
will receive any type of fee in connection with a real estate transaction in addition to a real estate 
commission, that fee must be disclosed in writing to all parties to the transaction. 
6.2.11. Fees from Builders. All fees paid to a licensee for referral of prospects to builders 
must be paid to the licensee by the principal broker with whom he is licensed and affiliated. All 
fees must be disclosed as required by Rl62-6.2.10. 
6.2.12. Fees from Manufactured Housing Dealers. If a licensee refers a prospect to a 
manufactured home dealer or a mobile home dealer, under terms as defined in Section 58-56-1, 
et seq., any fee paid for the referral of a prospect must be paid to him by the principal broker with 
whom he is licensed. 
6.2.13. Gifts and Inducements. A gift given by a principal broker to a buyer or seller, lessor 
or lessee, in a real estate transaction as an inducement to use the services of a real estate 
brokerage, or in appreciation for having used the services of a brokerage, is permissible and is 
not an illegal sharing of commission. If an inducement is to be offered to a buyer or seller, lessor 
or lessee, who will not be obligated to pay a real estate commission in a transaction, the principal 
broker must obtain from the party who will pay the commission written consent that the 
inducement be offered. 
6.2.14. "Due-On-Sale" Clauses. Real estate licensees have an affirmative duty to disclose in 
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writing to buyers and sellers the existence or possible existence of a "due-on-sale" clause in an 
underlying encumbrance on real property, and the potential consequences of selling or 
purchasing a property without obtaining the authorization of the holder of the underlying 
encumbrance. 
6.2.15. Personal Assistants. With the permission of the principal broker with whom the 
licensee is affiliated, the licensee may employ an unlicensed individual to provide services in 
connection with real estate transactions which do not require a real estate license, including the 
following examples: 
(a) Clerical duties, including making appointments for prospects to meet with real estate 
licensees, but only if the contact has been initiated by the prospect and not by the unlicensed 
person; 
(b) At an open house, distributing preprinted literature written by a licensee, so long as a 
licensee is present and the unlicensed person furnishes no additional information concerning the 
property or financing and does not become involved in negotiating, offering, selling or filling in 
contracts; 
(c) Acting only as a courier service in delivering documents, picking up keys, or similar 
services, so long as the courier does not engage in any discussion of, or filling in of, the 
documents; 
(d) Placing brokerage signs on listed properties; 
(e) Having keys made for listed properties; and 
(f) Securing public records from the County Recorders1 Offices, zoning offices, sewer 
districts, water districts, or similar entities. 
6.2.15.1. If personal assistants are compensated for their work, they shall be compensated at 
a predetermined rate which is not contingent upon the occurrence of real estate transactions. 
Licensees may not share commissions with unlicensed persons who have assisted in transactions 
by performing the services listed in this rule. 
6.2.15.2. The licensee who hires the unlicensed person will be responsible for supervising 
the unlicensed person's activities, and shall ensure that the unlicensed person does not perform 
activity which requires a real estate license. 
6.2.15.3. Unlicensed individuals may not engage in telephone solicitation or other activity 
calculated to result in securing prospects for real estate transactions, except as provided in 
R162-6.2.15.(a) above. 
6.2.16. Fiduciary Duties. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf owe the 
following fiduciary duties to the principal: 
6.2.16.1. Duties of a seller's or lessor's agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his 
behalf who act solely on behalf of the seller or the lessor owe the seller or the lessor the 
following fiduciary duties: 
(a) Loyalty, which obligates the agent to, act in the best interest of the seller or the lessor 
instead of all other interests, including the agent's own; 
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to obey all lawful instructions from the seller or 
lessor; 
(c) Full disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the seller or lessor all material 
information which the agent learns about the buyer or lessee or about the transaction; 
(d) Confidentiality, which prohibits the agent from disclosing any information given to the 
agent by the seller or lessor which would likely weaken the seller's or lessor's bargaining position 
if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the seller or lessor to disclose the 
information. This duty does not require the agent to withhold any known material fact 
concerning a defect in the property or the seller's or lessor's ability to perform his obligations; 
(e) Reasonable care and diligence; 
(f) Holding safe and accounting for all money or property entrusted to the agent; and 
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(g) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement. 
6.2.16.2. Duties of a buyer's or lessee's agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his 
behalf who act solely on behalf of the buyer or lessee owe the buyer or lessee the following 
fiduciary duties: 
(a) Loyalty, which obligates the agent to act in the best interest of the buyer or lessee instead 
of all other interests, including the agent's own; 
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to obey all lawful instructions from the buyer or 
lessee; 
(c) Full Disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the buyer or lessee all material 
information which the agent learns about the property or the seller's or lessor's ability to perform 
his obligations; 
(d) Confidentiality, which prohibits the agent from disclosing any information given to the 
agent by the buyer or lessee which would likely weaken the buyer's or lessee's bargaining 
position if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the buyer or lessee to disclose 
the information. This duty does not permit the agent to misrepresent, either affirmatively or by 
omission, the buyer's or lessee's financial condition or ability to perform; 
(e) Reasonable care and diligence; 
(f) Holding safe and accounting for all money or property entrusted to the agent; and 
(g) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement. 
6.2.16.3. Duties of a limited agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf 
who act as agent for both seller and buyer, or lessor and lessee, commonly referred to as "dual 
agents," are limited agents since the fiduciary duties owed to seller and to buyer, or to lessor and 
lessee, are inherently contradictory. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf may 
act in this limited agency capacity only if the informed consent of both buyer and seller, or lessor 
and lessee, is obtained. 
6.2.16.3.1. In order to obtain informed consent, the principal broker or a licensee acting on 
his behalf shall clearly explain to both buyer and seller, or lessor and lessee, that they are each 
entitled to be represented by their own agent if they so choose, and shall obtain written 
agreement from both parties that they will each be giving up performance by the agent of the 
following fiduciary duties: 
(a) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to buyer and seller, or 
lessor and lessee, that they are giving up their right to demand undivided loyalty from the agent, 
although the agent, acting in this neutral capacity, shall advance the interest of each party so long 
as it does not conflict with the interest of the other party. In the event of conflicting interests, the 
agent will be held to the standard of neutrality; and 
(b) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to buyer and seller, or 
lessor and lessee, that there will be a conflict as to a limited agent's duties of confidentiality and 
full disclosure, and shall explain what kinds of information will be held confidential if told to a 
limited agent by either buyer or seller, or lessor and lessee, and what kinds of information will be 
disclosed if told to the limited agent by either party. The limited agent may not disclose any 
information given to the agent by either principal which would likely weaken that party's 
bargaining position if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the principal to 
disclose the information; and 
(c) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to the buyer and 
seller, or lessor and lessee, that the limited agent will be required to disclose information given to 
the agent in confidence by one of the parties if failure to disclose the information would be a 
material misrepresentation regarding the property or regarding the abilities of the parties to fulfill 
their obligations. 
(d) The Division and the Commission shall consider use of consent language approved by 
the Division and the Commission to be informed consent. 
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6.2.16.3.2. In addition, a limited agent owes the following fiduciary duties to all parties: 
(a) Obedience, which obligates the limited agent to obey all lawfiil instructions from either 
the buyer or the seller, lessor and lessee, consistent with the agent's duty of neutrality; 
(b) Reasonable care and diligence; 
(c) Holding safe all money or property entrusted to the limited agent; and 
(d) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement. 
6.2.16.4. Duties of a sub-agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who 
act as sub-agents owe the same fiduciary duty to a principal as the brokerage retained by the 
principal. 
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